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ABSTRACT
This paper reviews and puts into perspective recent work
reassessing the first and second Fundamental Theorems of Welfare
Economics. It assesses the implications of the
Greenwald-Stiglitz fheorem establishing the (constrained) Pareto
inefficiency of market economies with imperfect information and
incomplete markets as well as recent work on endogenous
technological change. The information theoretic limitations to
the Second Fundamental Theorem are also discussed, including the
inability to separate out issues of equity and efficiency. The
final sections of the paper consider the consequences of these
problems for economic organization, economic policy, and the role





Stanford, CA 94305-6072The Invisible Hand and Modern Welfare Economics1
J. E. Stiglitz
Somewhat more than two centuries ago, Adam Smith delivered at this
University a set of lectures, later written downinhis monumental work, The
Wealth of Nations, which perhaps had more influence on the development of
our discipline than any other work in the history of the subject. And among
the ideas presented there, perhaps none has held such sway, not only over
professional economics, but also over all those who concerned about how best
to organize society to promote the General Welfare than his concept of the
invisible hand: this, in spite of the fact that he explicitly used the term
only once in The Wealth of Nations.
Smith argued not only that individuals were led in the pursuit of their
self interest by an invisible hand to pursue the Nation's interest, but
also that this pursuit of self interest was a far more reliable way to
ensure that the Public Interest would be served than any alternative- -surely
better than relying on some government leader, as well-intentioned as that
leader might be.
Much of the subsequent history of our discipline has been a search to
understand the sense and conditions under which Smith's essential insights
are valid. His perspective has provided the intellectual basis for a theory
of economic organization- -competitive markets provide an efficient way of
organizing economic activity- -and economic policy- -toensure that efficiency
1Thisis a substantially revised version of a lecture originally
presented at Glasgow University in December, 1988.This paper is based on
research supported in part by the Olin Foundation, the National Science
Foundation, and the Hoover Institution. Many of the ideas presented in this
paper are based on joint work with Richard Arnott, Bruce Greenwald, Raaj
Sah, and Andrew Weiss.
1is attained, it is best to rely on markets and individual self-interest.
George Stigler Is quoted (by A. Skinner, 1976) as having said, on the
occasion of the celebrations marking the two hundredth anniversary of The
Wealth of Nations, that Smith is alive and well and living in Chicago.
Whether Smith really would be as happy at Chicago as he would be, at say,
Stanford or MIT need not detain us here.He certainly recognized the
existence of what today we would clearly describe as important classes of
market failures.2
The Fundamental Theorems of Welfare Economics are generally viewed as
the culmination of this search for a precise interpretation of what I shall
refer to as the Smithian view. (The form in which these theorems are stated
today is generally attributed to Kenneth Arrow (1951) and Gerard Debreu,
1959.) The first theorem states that (under certain conditions) the
competitive economy is always Pareto efficient3; the second theorem says
that every Pareto efficient allocation can be attained through the price
2lndeed, in that single passage in The Wealth of Nations in which he
uses the term invisible hand, he invokes the notions of risk aversion and
(implicitly) imperfect risk markets to explain why capital was imperfectly
mobile across national boundaries. And for him, this market imperfection
was a good thing, for it ensured that the savings of the nation, its
capital, would be used to increase the wealth of the nation, rather than the
wealth of some other nation. This passage seems to suggest that Smith did
not have in mind a notion of a perfect market.
If he had been born a little later, he might have used evolutionary
ideas to explain how it was that economic and social institutions evolved
which had the property that the common good was attained as a result of
individuals pursuing their own self interest.As it was, the general
principle behind the invisible hand was left rather vague; the numerous
instances in which it manifested itself (although without using the term)
made it clear that there was some general force or principle at work.
3That is, no one can be made better off without making someone else
worse off.
2system.A11(!) the government needs to do is engage in some initial lump
sum transfers (taxes and subsidies).4
The conditions under which the First Theorem are true turn out to have
important economic interpretations. Interpreting those conditions and
identifying policies by which Pareto efficiency can be restored provides the
basis of what has come to be called the Market Failure approach to Modern
Welfare Economics. Early discussions of market failure (e.g. F. Bator,
1958) focused on externalities, natural monopolies, and public goods. But
the conventional wisdom held that even when such market failures arose,
only limited government intervention was needed: for instance, fines for
pollution, congestion tolls for the externalities associated with crowding.
Only in the case of pure public goods did government have to be actively
involved, if not in producing the goods, at least in financing them (there
remained a debate about the advantages of government versus private
production.).5 6Laterdiscussions (reflected in this essay) focused on
4Lump sum transfers are transfers, the magnitude of which do not depend
at all on variables which cannot be altered by the individual.When
transfers depend on variables which can be altered, the individual has an
incentive to distort his behavior, in order to increase the magnitude of his
subsidy or reduce the magnitude of his tax.
5There were,to be sure, other market failures, where price
interventions did not seem to work so well:zoning might be required to
deal with the externalities associated with urban living, though zoning,
like other forms of government intervention, had its problems as well.
6Themost recent manifestation of this discussion is the debate over
privatization.While there is a large literature discussing when there
should be public provision of a good, there is very little analytic
discussion of public production.See, for instance, Vickers and Yarrow
[1988) and the Summer 1987 issue of the Journal of Policy Analysis and
Management, in particular, the article by Sappington and Stiglitz, proving
what they call the Fundamental Theorem of Privatization.
3problems of incomplete markets, imperfect information, and the pervasiveness
of imperfect competition.
Of course,the distribution of income which emerged from the
competitive market may not be to a society's liking7. And this is where the
second Welfare Theorem enters. It says that every Pareto efficient
allocation of resources can be attained by means of the market. All the
government needs to do is to engage in some initial redistributions, and
then leave the rest to the market process.It says, for instance, that
capitalism cannot be criticized on the grounds that it results in the
accumulation of too much wealth in the hands of too few individuals. If you
don't like that particular outcome, simply impose redistributive taxes. The
government does not have to take over firms; it does not have to nationalize
the basic industries.
The Second Fundamental Theorem of welfare economics has fundamental
implications for how we think about economic organization. It says that we
can separate out issues of economic efficiency from issues of equity.
Economists need not concern themselves with value judgments; whatever the
government's distributive objectives, it implements these through initial
71n this part of my discussion, I am being deliberately vague in the
use of terms like, "society's liking" or "common welfare" or "public
interest."Society does not have preferences; individuals do.As Arrow
[1951] has emphasized, there must be some way of going from individuals'
preferences to statements concerning society's, some way of aggregation.
Arrow showed that there was no such way which satisfied a certain minimal
set of properties which one would like a social welfare function to satisfy.
At a somewhat looser level, there is still a broad social consensus
about some attributes of society which are desirable- -aconsensus to which,
admittedly, not everyone will subscribe.For instance, were society to
leave 50 % of its citizens unemployed, there would be a view that "something
was wrong."
4lump sum taxes and subsidies, and then leaves the market to work for
itself.
The past quarter century has seen a closer examination of Adam Smith's
invisible hand.The theoretical research has taken two different strands
(reflecting two ideological strands within the profession, a point to which
I shall return later.) The first has attempted to show that the economy is
Pareto efficient under much more general conditions than those originally
used by Arrow and Debreu. The second has attempted to show that there were
assumptions in Arrow and Debreu's analysis which, while perhaps mentioned,
did not receive the attention they deserved.These assumptions make the
Theorems of limited relevance to modern industrial economies. In this view,
Adam Smith's invisible hand may be invisible because, like the Emperor's new
clothes, it simply isn't there; or if it is there, it is too palsied to be
relied upon.
PART I.
Four Objections to The Invisible Hand:
Pareto Inefficiency of Market Economies
The Welfare Theorems are just that: theorems, the conclusions of which
follow inevitably from the assumptions.The research of the last two
decades has not detected any major flaws of logic. The Theorems stand, as I
have said, as one of the triumphs of modern mathematical economics.The
question is not the logical status of these propositions, but their
empirical relevance, the inferences which we make concerning how society
5should be organized and about the design of economic policy. These are, to
be sure, matters of judgment.
The earlier analyses of market failures basically agreed with the
underlying conception of the market economy that was reflected in the
assumptions of the Welfare Theorems. I am not so convinced.8
Smith was undoubtedly right that individuals' pursuits of their private
interests lead to social consequences which may be quite different from
those they intended. But whether it leads to (Pareto) efficient outcomes is
a far different manner.
A. Unemployment 10
The persistence and pervasiveness across countries of periodic episodes
of high industrial unemployment should at least Induce skepticism concerning
the Smithian vision. Surely, the economy can do better than the widespread
misery which afflicted the major industries economies in the Great
Depression. Are Hoovervilles and unemployment queues manifestations of the
Invisible Hand? Can't we do better than that!
81 touch on several aspects of this below. See also Stiglitz (1989a).
In many discussions of market failure, unemployment is not treated as
a market failure in its own right, but rather as a consequence of some other
market failure (e.g. imperfect information or incomplete markets).
10This section draws heavily on my joint work with Bruce Greenwald, to
whom I am greatly indebted, in particular, Greenwald and Stiglitz (1986 and
1988).
6Two Schools of Economics.
The importance attached to this phenomena of unemployment has lead to
two distinct views of capitalism.One view, tracing its origins to Smith,
has stressed the efficiency properties of capitalism.Unemployment was
viewed as but a temporary aberration from a norm of a well functioning
economy. It has emphasized its virtues, reflected in the Fundamental
Theorem of Welfare Economics. It has provided the intellectual foundations
for the ideological commitment to market economies.
The second strand, which can perhaps be traced by to Maithus, earned
our discipline the name of the dismal science.It was concerned with
unemployment which seemed endemic in capitalist economies.''
Little love was lost between the practitioners of these two sub-
disciplines, who had such different conceptions of how capitalism
functioned. Theyhurled epithets at each other; the micro-economists,
adopting the Smithian view, charged the macro-economists, the latter day
descendants of Maithus, with that most base of all academic crimes, ad
hocery (and sometimes, even worse, inconsistency.) The other side responded
in kind- -irrelevancewas the charge which perhaps stuck with greatest
force.
Lest students be confused by the seeming schizophrenia within the
profession, we offered different courses, taught by different faculty, on
macro-economics and on micro-economics.The students' usual ability to
compartmentalize their learning into neat categories, with little spillovers
from one course to another, had a last found a use!
''Malthus was also concerned with problems of over population, which
will not detain us.
7The two schools of thought are reflected in two styles of papers
commonly found in the literature. Each begins, after a brief introduction,
by writing dowii a simple model; one then proceeds to show chat the market
allocation is Pareto efficient, even though the standard Arrow Debreu
assumptions do not hold; the others show that the economy is not Pareto
efficient, even though all but one of the Arrow Debreu assumptions are
valid, and the one assumption which is altered is one which is not very
plausible.
The Neoclassical Synthesis
Adam Smith was right about the power of self interest and the profit
motive. Publishers saw an incentive in packing these two disparate subjects
between hard covers. One of Paul Samuelson's greatest strokes of genius was
the invention of the Neoclassical Synthesis, which argued that once the
Keynesian problems of unemployment were dealt with, the neoclassical world
reigned supreme.This proposition was put forward with such clarity and
such conviction that it became virtually universally subscribed to within
the profession. But let us be quite clear about the epistemological basis
of the Neoclassical Synthesis. It is not a deductive proposition:
Samuelson did not formulate a general theory which explained unemployment,
and from which it followed that the elimination of unemployment would lead
to Pareto efficiency. He did not have an explanation of wage rigidities or
the other factors that might lead to Keynesian unemployment. The
neoclassical synthesis was put forward as a dogma, an article of faith. It
was believed because we wanted to believe it.
8We wanted to believe It for two reasons. First, it meant that we did
not have to throw out the accuiulated wisdom concerning how markets lead to
resource allocations, the Insights into economics which a century and a half
of social thinkers had brought to the subject.
And most of us also believed in the market system: the record based on
attempts at alternatives has hardly made these alternatives inviting.
But on the face of it, it was an incredible hypothesis.To give an
analogy:it would be like suggesting that individuals who are not in the
hospital with a fever of 105 degrees must be in perfect health.We have
learned from medicine that the study of pathology, of how the system behaves
when all is not well, provides us with many insights into how the human
system functions normally.So too, we should learn from the economic
pathologies- -theless developed economies in which more than three fourths
of humanity lives and the periodic episodes of unemployment which plague the
more developed countries- -something about the functioning of capitalism.
To put it another way, it seems far more plausible to me that the
economy is always slightly inefficient:it is only the extreme cases of
inefficiency which can easily be detected. There is other evidence
corroborating this view. Most of us are not in a position to judge whether
General Motors is efficient; we simply do not know the technology of car
production. We might think that we can do a better job than Roger Smith12,
but he would tell us that we are not fully aware of the difficulties of the
job. The one aspect of technology which is relatively publicly available is
the 'tax technology"- -the set of rules which determine the liabilities which
individuals and firms must pay.These are summarized in a scant few
12Chairman of the Board and Chief Operating Officer of General Motors.
9volumes, with a few more volumes of court interpretations. With this data
we cannot test the much more general principle with which Smith was
concerned, with whether the rational pursuit of self interest would lead to
Pareto efficiency; but we can test the more limited hypothesis of whether
market forces lead firms to behave in a (privately) efficient way.The
resounding evidence is negative- -if they learn, they learn with remarkable
slowness. (See Stiglitz, 1973a, l982b, 1983, for a discussion of these tax
"paradoxes."13)
A Digression on Methodology
The appropriateness of assumptions and the relevance of models to "real
world" situations is inevitably a matter of debate. Models are not perfect
reflections of reality. And it is not even clear how we measure the extent
to which they depart. Closeness of fit may be one test- -but in time series
data,R2are typically high for almost any specification. Naive
extrapolation models do almost as well- -sometimes better- -thanmore
sophisticated models which are allegedly theoretically well specified.
Today, indeed, the soundness of the theory behind the empirical testing is
supposed to be an important element in persuading us concerning the
13The literature on tax paradoxes shows that firms and individuals
could take actions which reduce their tax liabilities- -and had no further
consequences.The most longstanding of these paradoxes is the dividend
paradox:firms could, by buying back their shares rather than issuing
dividends, substantially reduce the cumulative amount of corporate plus
individual income taxes paid on income earned within corporations.Other
paradoxes include the choice of LIFO versus FIFO accounting, the failure to
use accelerated depreciation, and the use of stock options as part of the
compensation schemes for senior management.
It is difficult to distinguish among alternative explanations of these
paradoxes: (a)managers are irrational and/or do not take actions which
maximize the welfare of their shareholders; (b) managers are rational, but
they believe shareholders are irrational.
10plausibility of the results. That is why it is the fashion to begin applied
econometric papers with detailed discussions of theory. Unfortunately, much
of the theory is hardly worthy of the name- -and I am not referring here to
mathematical niceties which may have been slipped over.Consider the
neoclassical investment theory.'4 Modiglianl. and Miller [1958) purported to
show that financial policy was irrelevant. Thus,the theoretical
specification precluded including the kinds of cash flow and balance sheet
variables that earlier studies (such as Meyer and Kuh, 1957) had established
to be relevant. Yet that theory was indeed a special, and I would argue,
largely irrelevant theory (as useful as it was for the theoretical
development of the discipline):it required no bankruptcy, no information
asymmetries, no transactions costs, and no differential taxation of
dividends and interests, all assumptions which were far from the mark, and
whose implications drastically changed the theory.Financial variables
should have been included in the analysis.'6
In the end, certain critical experiments are likely to be more
information than a general goodness of fit test.In the contest between
Newtonian mechanics and Einstein's relativity theory, no one proposed that
14See,e.g. Jorgenson (1968) or Hall and Jorgenson (1969).
1it is worth noting that more recent studies, such as those by Hubbard
and his co-authors, reconfirm the importance of balance sheet and cash flow
variables.
16Another example are those studies of aggregate consumer behavior
which impose restrictions, derived from the analysis of utility maximization
behavior of single individuals. Imposing the restriction of the symmetry of
the Slutsky terms makes the empirical study theoretically sound- -though
aggregate demand curves need not satisfy the Slutsky relationship (or the
other restrictions which are derived from individual behavior) See, e.g.
Mantel (1974)
11the two should be compared on the basis of how well they did on every day
data.Newtonian mechanics would have done at least as well as relativity.
But there were critical experiments (in particular, the solar eclipse
experiment of March 29, 1919 done by the Royal Astronomical Society of
England in Northern Brazil):a predication of relativity theory, which
distinguished it from the Newtonian mechanics.
Unemployment as the Critical Test of the Invisible Hand
The pervasiveness and persistence of unemployment is, in my mind, the
most telling "critical experiment" which should lead to the rejection of the
basic competitive equilibrium model which (depending on how you view it)
either predicts or assumes full employment.
Economists, like other individuals, have developed a variety of ways of
responding to facts with which they do not like to deal.'7 It is sometimes
suggested, for instance, that the data may not really mean what they say.
(Of course they don't, but while we may not be sure whether there was 20 or
22% or 30% unemployment in the industrial sector in 1933, we know it was
large )
Theresponse which I find most peculiar is somewhat akin to Senator
Aitken's response to how to deal with the unpleasantries facing the US as a
result of the Vietnam war: how to withdraw with honor. His suggestion was
that we should simply declare that we had won, and go home. So, too, those
who want to believe in the Smithian vision:they simply declare that the
'7This general phenomenon is sometimes called cognitive dissonance, a
characteristic of human behavior which, with few exceptions, modern
economics has systematically ignored, in spite of the strong evidence of
its importance in the psychological literature, for an important exception,
see Akerlof and Dickens.
12unemployed are all voluntarily unemployed. We take it as a dogma within the
profession that we do not ask how tastes are formed:they are treated as
exogenous. Evidently, there are periodic shifts in the demand for leisure,
no more explicable than other periodic shifts in tastes: why do consumers
like yogurt and pizza today, goods for which there was little taste but
fifty years ago.And who are we to question then how they spend their
leisure: if it happens to be in job queues, why should we question that any
more than we question how many hours they spend watching TV? 18
As you can tell, I am not sympathetic with this view.Indeed, the
macroeconomic evidence against the competitive paradigm is, by now,
overwhelming.(See, for instance, Hall, 1988) and Greenwald and Stiglitz,
l988b.)It touches not only on the presence of unemployment, but also on
movements in real wages, employment, output, etc.
I have been troubled- -and puzzled- -by the popularity of those macro-
economic schools (new classical and real business cycle theory) which have
been based on the competitive paradigm, and the corollary propositions that
there is no unemployment, extreme views which, while restoring the
generality of the Invisible Hand, Adam Smith, I am sure, would have looked
upon with horror.I ask myself, would they view the world this way had they
or their parents experienced a long episode of unemployment?
A part of the popularity of these views is a result of the ability of
these models to reconcile macro-economics and micro-economics.I referred
earlier to the schism in economics between the two branches of economics,
and the associated two views of capitalism.The desire to resolve the
'8By the same token, other indicators of distress, such as suicide
rates, which increase in recessions and depressions, would be taken as
bringing us into a quite different discipline, that of sociology.
13intellectual tension was strong. We have already commented on the failure
of the "neoclassical synthesis" to do so.This left two alternatives:
making macro- like micro- ; or making micro- like macro.
The former approach had one strong advantage.Through the work of
Arrow and Debreu and a host of other neo-classical economists, micro-
economics had been formulated on a rigorous basis.(Never mind that it
produced few testable propositions, or that the testable propositions which
it offered were rejected!'9) It had just the right amount of mathematical
difficulty and sophistication: easy enough to be mastered by a hard working
student, difficult enough to present a challenge.
But the curious aspect of this intellectual episode is that these
versions of the neo-classical model became adapted to macro-economics just
as micro-economists were coming to look upon them with suspicion, as they
realized that slight changes in its assumptions of perfect and costless
information and complete markets dramatically altered the conclusions.20
Indeed, among the motivations for these reformulations of micro-
economics was the development of theories which could be made consistent
with macro-economic evidence.
At the same time, micro-theorists came to realize that the standard
competitive model provided relatively few restrictions on market demand
(e.g. consumption, savings, and labor supply) functions. Any set of excess
demand functions satisfying Walras' Law could be shown to be consistent with
rational utility maximizing individuals, given particular preferences and
19See, for instance, the discussion of tax paradoxes above.
20For a survey of some of these results, see Stiglitz (1985).
14endowments.2'Thus, macro-economists who took the methodological position
that postulated aggregative behavior be derived from rational utility
maximizing behavior were not really insisting on rationality, but on much
stronger--and generally unacceptable-- hypotheses, such as that it should be
derivedfrom rationalutility maximizing behavior ofasingle,
representative individual. Indeed, many adherents of these views have put
so much stress on the ability to calculate the derived savings/consumption
functions that they have been willing to postulate utility functions- -such
as those with constant absolute risk aversion- -forwhich there is strong
empirical evidence that they provide a bad description of the behavior of
most individuals 22
B.Imperfect Information and Incomplete Markets
If, as I have argued, the persistence and pervasiveness of periodic
episodes of unemployment provides the critical test of the conclusions of
the standard competitive paradigm, we need to identify what are the precise
properties of the standard competitive model which are wrong. Which of the
assumptions have to be dropped to yield the macro-economic phenomena
described in previous paragraphs? These remain unresolved questions.But
among the suggestions that look promising are those which lay at least part
21See, e.g. Debreu (1973), Mantel (1974), or Sonnenschein (1973).
22Thus, the constant absolute utility function (the exponential utility
function) predicts that all individuals will hold the same portfolio of
risky assets, and that the wealth elasticity of demand for risky assets is
zero. The fact that the utility function has other predictions- -that
consumption increases linearly with wealth- -which are not so easy to reject
does not make the utility function any more persuasive. A theory must be
evaluated in terms of all of its (verifiable) predictions. A theory based
on constant absolute risk aversion utility functions is simply a non-starter.
15of the blame at the feet of imperfect and costly information and incomplete
risk and futures markets.
Much work in the past fifteen years has been concerned with examining
more precisely how imperfect information and incomplete markets affect the
standard micro-economic results.We now know that they alter them in
fundamental ways23; not only may they provide part of the explanation for
unemployment, but they provide much of the explanation for many of the
institutions we see in our society, institutions which otherwise are hard to
explain (e.g. sharecropping, credit rationing, equity rationing, etc.).
Standard results, such as the Law of the Single Price, do not hold. They
explain why the simple model of price-governed economic behavior provides art
inadequate description of market economies. Reputations and contracts play
an equally important role, one not captured by the Arrow-Debreu model (see
Stiglitz, 1989b) 24
Most important for our purposes is the result that in general. when
risk markets are incomplete and information is imperfect, markets are not
constrained Pareto optimal: the Invisible Hand does not work. There exist
market interventions, which respect the limitations on information and risk
distribution opportunities, which can make everyone better off.(Greenwald
and Stiglitz, 1986, 1988a)25 26 27 28
235ee Stiglitz (1985) for a description of how the central standard
results of competitive analysis are altered.
24The failure to recognize this provides part of the explanation for
the failure of market socialism.
25There are other reasons that imperfect information is likely to lead
to the invisible hand not being satisfied:imperfect information leads to
imperfect competition (Scitovsky (1945, 1950), Diamond (1971a,b), Arrow
(1958), Salop (1979), Stiglitz (1989b)). Perfect competition is an
essential assumption in the standard proofs of the Fundamental Theorems of
16Of course, imperfect information is pervasive in the economy. We know
that different individuals differ in their abilities, but we cannot tell
perfectly who is the more productive.We know that different investment
opportunities will yield different returns, but we cannot be sure which will
yield the highest.We know the some individuals are more accident prone
than others, but we cannot tell for sure who is the most accident prone. We
know that default probabilities differ among borrowers, but we cannot be
sure about the default probability of any particular individual.
Risk markets are far from complete. Many of the important risks which
we face are uninsurable.
Given the pervasiveness of imperfect information and incomplete
markets, it would seem that the model that Greenwald and Stiglitz describe- -
inwhich the invisible hand is, at best palsied--is far more relevant than
Welfare Economics. See below for more on imperfect competition.
I focus my discussion here on the first of the Fundamental Theorems
of Welfare Economics.I shall come shortly to a discussion of the Second
Fundamental Theorem. For now, we simply note that an essential assumption
in the standard proofs of the second theorem is the convexity of the
relevant preferences and technologies. Those convexity assumptions are not,
in general, satisfied with imperfect information.See Arnott and Stiglitz
(1988) and Radner and Stiglitz (1984) and below.
27Arnott and Stiglitz (1989) have provided a general taxonomy of the
market failures associated with moral hazard, as well as an analysis of the
use of Pigouvian corrective taxes in this context (Arnott and Stiglitz,
1986). They have illustrated the pervasiveness of these market failures by
examining the inefficiency of implicit labor contracts (Arnott and Stiglitz,
1985).
26Since Stiglitz's (1972, 1982a) papers showing that stock market
equilibrium will, in general, be constrained Pareto efficient, there has
developed a vast literature on this subject. See, for instance,
Ceanakoplos, et.al., forthcoming.
For an application to labor markets- -showing that the implicit contract
between workers and their employers will not,in general, result in an
efficient risk distribution (see Newbery and Stiglitz, 1987).
17the model which Arrow and Debreu described, in which the invisible hand
works perfectly. From this perspective, Arrow and Debreu's great
achievement was not to prove a general result- -it is a very special model
indeed.But rather, it was to find those special and limiting conditions
under which the Invisible Hand theorems hold.Their contribution can be
seen as a negative contribution--as showing how limited Adam Smith's
original conjecture was.
Let me try to describe the intuition behind our result, perhaps seen
most clearly in the case of an adverse selection model, like Akerlof's
Lemons model (1970), applied here to the labor market (Greenwald, 1986).
Individuals have different qualities of labor; the market cannot distinguish
who is good.Firms pay a wage corresponding to the average productivity;
and the average productivity is a function of the wage.As the wage or
price of a good which is a complement or substitute to leisure changes,
individuals change their labor supply; this has no direct welfare effect,
because of the envelope theorem:at the old wages and prices, individuals
were choosing their labor supply to maximize their utility.As the wage
increases, firms are worse off, consumers are better off, but this is simply
a transfer effect: under the hypothesis of market clearing, the gains of
one are equal to the losses of the other.29 But an increase in the price,
say, of alcohol has a direct externality effect. Assume that alcohol leads
lower ability individuals not to show up for work as much, so that the
quality mix of job applicants improves.30 This improvement in the quality
291n Creenwald and Stiglitz (l988b) we show how the analysis can be
extended to the case where markets do not clear.
30We assume that neither the alcohol consumption, nor the absenteeism
which is a consequence, can be observed by employers.
18mix acts as an externality; at any wage, employers gain. And it is easy to
show that the gain to employers is sufficiently great that, were an output
or profits tax imposed on them, it would more than pay for the subsidy
required to lower the price of alcohol.
Criticisms of the Greenwald-Stiglitz Theorem
There have been two responses to this theorem by those who want to
retain their faith in the invisible hand. The first recognizes the logical
validity of the conclusions, but questions the empirical significance. How
do we know that slight deviations from perfect information lead to any more
than a slight deviation from Pareto optimality?
In a sense, we cannot be sure- -but neither can we be sure that slight
deviations do not cause large deviations from market efficiency. (Slight
deviations in some of the informational assumptions have been shown to lead
to marked deviations in the qualitative properties of equilibrium; epsilon
search costs may lead to monopoly prices (Diamond, 1971a,b), price
rigidities (Stiglitz, 1987c), price dispersion (Salop and Stiglitz, 1977) or
non-existence of equilibrium (Salop and Stiglitz, 1982).31
Nor is there any evidence that the market has only a slight amount of
imperfect information, or that risk markets are virtually complete.What
the Creenwald Stiglitz theorem has done has been to remove the long standing
presumption that markets are efficient, except for those well defined market
failures--externalities, public goods, etc. --which we dealt with earlier.
The Creenwald-Stiglitz conception of the market economy is fundamentally
different from that of Arrow and Debreu:the latter is seen as a limiting,
31For a survey, see Stiglitz (1989b).
19but uninteresting case of the former.In the Creenwald-Stiglitz view,
market failures, rather than appearing as isolated and easily correctable by
government intervention, appear to be all-pervasive.Whether, and how,
governments should intervene to correct these market failures is a question
to which I turn later in this lecture.
The second line of defense of the invisible hand theorem has been to
revert to the ideological position that "anything the government can do, the
private sector can do at least as well." Thus, if we obtain a result that
the government can institute a Pareto improvement, we must have- -somehow- -
introducedan artificial distinction between the information or transactions
costs facing the public and private sectors. We have, so to speak, compared
apples and oranges, or perhaps more aptly, caviar and shad roe.We have
made an irrelevant comparison.This point is reinforced by the results of
Prescott and Townsend (1984), who establish that the market economy with
adverse selection or moral hazard is Pareto efficient. Never mind that they
have failed to show what is wrong with the simple examples which we have
constructed which show precisely how the government can improve welfare.
They have established a general theorem, of which ours must(!) be a subcase.
In our work analyzing the efficiency of market economies, we have been
particularly attentive to this criticism.32We have shown that this
criticism is simply not valid. We have shown, for instance, how governments
can, in the presence of imperfect risk markets, impose taxes on observable
32This is true not only of my work with Bruce Creenwald, but also ofmy
work with David Newbery, analyzing the efficiency of economies with
imperfect risk markets (1981, 1985) (see also Stiglitz, 1982a), with Richard
Arnott, analyzing the inefficiency of markets with moral hazard (1986,
1989), with Carl Shapiro, analyzing the inefficiency of markets with
reputation effects (1984), and with Andrew Weiss, analyzing the inefficiency
of markets with credit rationing (1981).
20variables(like the level of investment), which result in Pareto
improvements.33 Similarly, Greenwald and Stiglitz (1986) and Arnott and
Stiglitz (1986) observe that Utheprivate sector could observe the level
of consumption of each good and service35 and the total level of purchases
of insurance for each contingency by each individual, then, even though
effort were unobservable, the market would be Pareto efficient; it would
make insurance premia depend on these variables. But they argue that these
variables are not realistically observable. On the other hand, the levels
of aggregate sales of various commodities (such as cigarettes) may be
observable. (Essentially, sales on secondary markets are unobservable.)
The government is in a unique position to impose taxes and subsidies on
total sales. A private insurance firm might try to insist that those who
purchase insurance from it also purchase cigarettes from it, at a higher
Thus, Newbery and Stiglitz (1985), in their model with no equity
markets, show that Pareto improvements can be obtained even if there cannot
be taxes and subsidies imposed on outputs.Note that unobservability (or
verifiability) of outputs is only one of the reasons for the failure of
equity markets to function.Moral hazard and adverse selection provide
alternative explanations (see, e.g. Myers and Majluf [1984] or Greenwald,
Stiglitz, and Weiss (1984]).
Grossman and Grossman and Hart attempted to provide an alternative
definition of efficiency, "social Nash Optimality" or "SNOP". Market
economies, they showed, had the property of SNOP. This definition had the
property that in the first period, the government took the level of
interpersonal transfers in each state of nature from one individual to
another as given, unaffected by government actions. But tax/subsidy
policies in the first period could affect relative prices in the second (or
later) period(s), and thus affect the level of transfers.Hence, SNOP
provided an inaccurate description of the constraints facing the government
in market economies.There is, by now, a consensus that SNOP does not
constitute a re-establishment of the Invisible Hand theorem for incomplete
markets. Indeed, it can be viewed as showing the strong kinds of
constraints that the government would have had to have faced for the market
economy to have been (constrained) Pareto efficient.
35Total labor supply, total borrowings and savings, etc. all have to be
observable. See also Arnott and Stiglitz (1986).
21than market price (as it tries to simulate the effect of a government
imposed cigarette tax). But it would find it difficult to stop individuals
from buying cigarettes from others.And even if all insurance companies
agreed on the level of "tax' to impose on cigarette consumption, and they
took over the cigarette industry, they could not stop the entry of a new
cigarette firm.The government has the power to prevent entry and to
enforce taxes.36 Prescott and Townsend, in their discussion of moral
hazard, in effect focus on the case in which quantities purchased were
observable, a case for which we had already established the optimality of
market allocations.
Thus, there are some circumstances- -beyond the Arrow Debreu model- -in
which the market economy is constrained Pareto efficient.By the time we
published our 1986 paper, most of these special cases had been discovered.
Unfortunately, in many cases, they represent the most easy cases to analyze.
Thus, the lack of risk markets presents no problem if (i) there is only one
commodity, so commodity taxation cannot affect relative prices (the case
studied by Diamond (1967) in his classic paper37; or (ii) there is no need
for a complete set of risk markets, for instance because all individuals are
identical (in which case there is no role for markets to transfer risks),
the case focused on by macro-economists using representative agent models;
or (iii) because individuals are risk neutral, in which case risk is
36 The government's powers are, of course, limited. If there were not
significant economies of scale in cigarette production, it could not stop
bootlegging in cigarettes; the threat of black markets puts a limit on the
magnitude of the taxes that can be imposed. But evidently, these taxes can
be quite high without significant black market activity developing.
Diamond made some other essential assumptions, such as no bankruptcy
and multiplicative risk.
22irrelevant. The point of our paper was to show precisely how special those
cases were.
The government has powers that are different from those of the private
sector (Stiglitz, 1989c). Our paper showed that there were a large variety
of circumstances in which those powers could be used to achieve a Pareto
improvement. Whether government would, or could, use those powers in this
way is a question to which I return in the concluding section of this
lecture.
C. Technological Change
An objection to the invisible hand theorem that is closely related to
that presented in the previous section (incomplete markets and imperfect
information) is that the model on which it is based assumes a fixed
technology (or more accurately, changes in technology are exogenously
determined.)38Technological change--the result of deliberate attempts by
firms to develop new products andto reduce costs of production-- is one of
the hallmarks, if not the hallmark of the twentieth century.Can one
really believe that one has described well modern industrial countries
without taking into account technological competition?
The processes by which technology is improved- -learningand R & D- -can
be viewed as a special form of information acquisition, and, as in our
earlier analysis of information, the fundamental theorems of welfare
economics- -themodern representations of the Invisible Hand- -do not apply.
38The same applies to information: the Arrow Debreu model does not
assume perfect information, only that beliefs do not change endogenously
within the model.
23Technological change (whether it occurs as a result of explicit
expenditures on R & D or as a result of learning by doing) gives rise to
economies of scale.R & D expenditures are fixed, sunk costs. Industries
where R & D is important will naturally, then, be imperfectly competitive.
(Stiglitz, 1987a, 1988a).
This is not a new insight:Schuinpeter argued this point forcefully
several decades ago.But both Schumpeter and Smith might have been
concerned with my raising questions concerning the invisible hand results:
though neither used the notion of Pareto Efficiency, both thought that the
spur to innovation was one of the main virtues of market competition.
They may have been right. Yet it is a view of competition which is not
at all embraced by the Arrow-Debreu model of competitive market economies,
and it is not embraced by the Fundamental Theorem of Welfare Economics,
which has been taken to be the modern embodiment of Smith's conception of
the invisible hand.
While Smith and Schumpeter may have been right in spirit (a point which
we have emphasized, for instance, in Dasgupta and Stiglitz, 1980), they were
clearly not correct in detail. Depending on the precise assumptions, patent
races can result in excessive expenditures on R & D (Dasgupta and Stiglitz,
1980) or insufficient expenditures (Stiglitz, l988a, Dasgupta and Stiglitz,
1988. )39
39Theuse of the patent system as an institution for providing rewards
for innovative activity is not just a happenstance. It has certain
efficiency properties, given the limitations on information. It avoids the
necessity of screening applicants for government grants: those who have
confidence in their ability to do research better than others (and can
convince others to provide the necessary capital) undertake the research.
It is difficult if not impossible to measure "marginal contributions"--how
much sooner an innovation becomes available as a result of the activity of a
particular individual. It is possible to tell who is first, but not easy to
24D. HumanNature
My final query concerning the Invisible Hand Theorem and the model on
which (modern renditions of) it are based is perhaps more fundamental and
philosophical.The Arrow-Debreu model is based on a particular conception
of individual and group behavior.The previous sections have criticized
particular assumptions, and have slown how reasonable modifications of those
assumptions lead to quite different results.I now want to raise some
questions about the appropriateness of that basic conception.
The Fundamental Theorem of Welfare Economics, like the invisible hand,
makes use of each individual's pursuit of his own self interest. Whether
individuals are rational or not, surely an individual's self interest is
more "reliable" as a guide to action than other motives of human behavior.
But while self interest is, undoubtedly, an important aspect of human
behavior, it is not the only aspect which has a consistent and persistent
effect on economic behavior.
In my Marschak lecture(l987b),"°I referred to two other
characteristics, human fallibility and human sociability.One of the
benefits of growing olderis the growing recognition of others'
fallibility. It is not only that mistakes get made:differences in
judgments are what makes life in organizations both so interesting and so
difficult.(Human fallibility can be viewed as another aspect of imperfect
information; but what is at issue is not just that individuals have
ascertain who "almost made it."
40This work was based on joint work with Raaj Sah (l985a, 1985b, 1986,
1987, 1988).
25incomplete information, say, concerning any project, but they have limited
abilities to process that information and limited capabilities to
communicate information: in the process errors are inevitably introduced.
Human fallibility means that an organization's decision making
structure makes a difference. It also makes a difference who- -which
particular individuals--have decision making powers, a subject which
engrosses much of the time of those who have had the good fortune to assume
decision making positions.
Note the marked contrast between the conception of market economies,
and in particular the firms within those economies, embodied in the Arrow
Debreu framework and that reflected in the Human Fallibility perspective.
In the former, decision making is indeed a boring task: managers do nothing
more than follow the textbook prescriptions of how to behave; they simply
set marginal cost equal to price, and, to borrow Joan Robinson's phrase,
they look up in the Book of Blueprints the appropriate page corresponding to
current factor prices.
Human Sociability--the fact that individuals are social animals, and
care about their relations with others- -also plays an important role in
determining economic behavior.For instance, there is convincing evidence
that individuals' perceptions of whether they are fairly treated affects
their work effort; fairness is largely a social concept- -one compares one's
wage with others in one's orbit of comparison. The recognition of this has
important consequences both for levels of wages and distribution of wages
within firms.41 42 43
See, e.g. Akerlof (1980, 1984). For an early articulation of what
is known as the "morale" basis of efficiency wages, see Stiglitz (1973b,
l974a). For a general survey of efficiency wage theory, see Stiglitz
26Two Problems with the Second Fundamental Theorem
We have come to recognize that the second Welfare Theorem, too, is
plagued with difficulties, the two most important of which I will now
briefly describe.
Absence of Lump Sum Taxes
The first is that the government cannot, and does not, rely on lump sum
taxes as a basis of redistribution.This, too, can be viewed as a
consequence of imperfect information: the government does not have the
information available to decide who should (given society's ethical values)
pay a lump sum tax, and who should receive a lump sum benefit.It must,
accordingly, make its judgement based on observable characteristics,
characteristics which, in almost all cases, are alterable, such as income.
But basing redistributions on these variables necessarily introduces
distortions. Individuals alter the alterable characteristics, to reduce the
payments they make or to increase the payments they receive.
(l987d)
421c ha further consequences as well.Nalebuff and Stiglitz (1983)
showed, for instance, that contests have major advantages, in providing
strong incentives with limited risk bearing.Further, they allow for
"incentive flexibility," an automatic adjustment
"3Thus, Nalebuff and Stiglitz (1983) identify some distinct advantages
of contests as incentive devices. The fact that they are not as extensively
employed as the theory suggestsispartially accountedfor by
sociological/psychological considerations.
"'This has been the basis of the literature growing out of Mirrlees'
(1971)seminal paper. The information interpretation of the tax-
redistribution problem is contained in Stiglitz (1987c), who coins the term
"the New New Welfare Economics" to distinguish between the Old New Welfare
Economics, where equity and efficiency considerations were separated,
27One of the central consequences of the Second Welfare Theorem was the
ability to separate efficiency issues from distribution issues.In the
absence of lump sum taxes, this separability is not possible.
Principal Agent Problems
One of the major advances of the economics of the past fifteen years is
the recognition of the importance of incentive problems. Incentive problems
do not arise, in an interesting way, in the traditional Arrow Debreu model,
which forms the basis of the Fundamental Theorems of Welfare Economics:
individuals perform in the contracted way, or they do not get paid.
The issue of providing incentives for workers is one of the central
problems facing managers; the issue of suppliers of capital providing
incentives to those to whom they have entrusted their funds, to use those
funds wisely, is one of the major problems facing investors. Some would go
so far as to say that the incentive issue is the central issue of economics.
Incentive issuesarise,fundamentally,becausesomeof the
consequences of one's actions affect others: the employer is benefited if I
work hard, the landlord is benefited if his sharecropper exerts greater
effort.
We now understand why these problems arise, and what assumptions of the
through the use of the concept of Pareto Optimality, but in which lump sum
taxes were employed, and the New doctrines, which explicitly recognize the
absence of lump sum redistributions. Stiglitz (1982c, 1987c) identifies the
set of Pareto Efficient tax structures, i.e., given the limited information
available to the government, the tax structures which maximize the welfare
of one group, given the welfare levels of other groups.
28standard Arrow Debreu model account for its unrealism in this dimension.45
What concerns me here are its consequences for the Invisible Hand.
To see these most clearly, let me turn to the example which
represented one of the earlier articulations of the principal agent problem-
-sharecropping (Stiglitz, l974b). There had been a long tradition
criticizing sharecropping as an inefficient social arrangement; because the
worker typically had to pay a third or a half of his output to the landlord,
his incentives were attenuated.Those who believed in the efficiency of
market institutions found this a puzzle.What Stiglitz showed was that,
given the limitations on risk markets, and given the limitations on
landlords' abilities to monitor workers (or the costs of monitoring),
sharecropping was an efficient institution.46
But it is an efficient institution given the distribution of wealth--
given the disparity between endowments of labor and endowments of capital
(land). The incentive problems associated with sharecropping simply would
not arise if all tenants owned the land upon which they worked. A
redistribution of land from landlords to peasants would probably not be a
45Again, this problem can largely be viewed as a problem of imperfect
information, the inability of the manager, say, to specify fully the actions
to be undertaken by the worker, and of imperfect risk markets, the
unwillingness of the worker to undertake contractual arrangements which
would give him better incentives, but at the cost of greater risk bearing.
For an analysis of the profound consequences of moral hazard problems
on the nature of competitive equilibriuni, see Arnott and Stiglitz (1983,
1988a)
46Actually, he only showed that it was locally efficient, that is, the
sharecropping contract was the solution to the problem of maximizing the
expected utility of the landlord, given a particular expected utility of
tenant-farmers. In general, the market equilibrium is not general
equilibrium Pareto efficient, a result which follows as a corollary of the
Greenwald-Stiglitz (1986) analysis.
29Pareto improvement: landlords would be worse off. But, to borrow a phrase
from Smith's classic work, the Wealth of the Nation- -the annual flow of
output- -would be increased, so long as the labor supply curve was not
backward bending.
And because, as Creenwald and Stiglitz have shown, economies in which
principal agent problems arise are almost never Pareto efficient, the
inequality of land ownership means that the economy not only will not be
maximizing national income, but also that It is, in fact, Pareto
inefficient.
Once again, we see that we cannot separate out issues of distribution
from efficiency.47
Part III.
Implications for Economic Organization
We care about the Invisible Hand, not only because of its Inherent
intellectual interest, but because it affects our views concerning how
society should organize the production of its goods and services and our
attitudes towards a wide range of government policies. In this section, I
illustrate this with several examples.
"7Exactly the same result was obtained in the Shapiro-Stiglitz (1984)
analysis of workers' incentives in industrial economies, with costly
monitoring.
30One of the results- -one could almost state it as a corollary- -of the
Arrow Debreu/Fundamental Theorems of Welfare Economics perspective on
economics is the Lange-Lerner-Taylor proposition concerning the equivalence
between market socialist economies and capitalist economies. Anyone who has
visited one of the so-called market socialist economies would suspect
something is amiss; and indeed, the model provides neither a good depiction
of the market socialist economies nor of modern capitalist economies.'8
Among the more important of these are two to which we have already called
attention:
In the Lange-Lerner-Taylor paradigm of market socialism, managers are
well brought-up dutiful servants of the state. They carry out their tasks
of maximizing profits at the prices presented to them by the State, without
need for incentives.Perhaps if the world were as simple as the model
presented it, this might be a relevant possibility: the manager is little
more than an engineer, looking up (as we have said) the relevant page in the
book of blueprints. Presumably, it would be relatively inexpensive to
monitor him.
But the complexities of decision making, wrought by the imperfections
of information and the pervasiveness of human fallibility, particularly in
environments where managers are responsible both for innovation and for
responding to changing circumstances, make such a model of economic
organization irrelevant for modern societies.
Economic organization matters. The extent of decentralization in
society matters.Sah and I have spelled out a number of the ways in which
it matters. Here, let me just illustrate the general principle: if
'8See Stiglitz (l989d) for a discussion of some of the relevant issues
31decision making is centralized, and the person responsible for making
decision making is competent, the economic organization may perform well;
but if he Is incompetent, it will perform badly. Centralization is like
putting all of one's eggs in one basket:just as we now recognize the
greater advantages of portfolio diversification in allocating one's wealth,
so, too, there are great advantages of diversification in allocating
decision making powers.We need only dwell a few minutes on the evils
wrought in this century as a result of the concentration of power in the
hands of a few individuals.
Part IV.
Economic Policy
The Invisible Hand touches upon almost every aspect of economic policy.
Here, I shall have time to comment on only one aspect, anti-trust.A
central assumption of the Fundamental Theorem of Welfare Economics is the
existence of competition.Without competition, there is market failure- -
monopolistswill exploit consumers by producing too little, charging too
high prices.
Traditional theory emphasized that, in the absence of government
imposed barriers, markets would be competitive, except if there were
increasing returns.
I referred earlier to a strand of literature which has been concerned
with showing that the Invisible Hand theorem is, in fact, stronger than the
earlier proofs might have lead one to believe.The analysis of the
32consequences of natural monopoly provides perhaps the best illustration of
this.
Following a long Chicago tradition (see, e.g. Demsetz, 1968), Baujuol
Panzar, and Willig (1982) have put forth the view that all that is needed is
potential competition, not actual competition to ensure that the invisible
hand works effectively- -thatprices will be driven down to average costs and
that economic efficiency will be attained.
As we put it on another occasion, this view, while it may be well
funded, is not well founded (Dasgupta and Stiglicz, 1988).Of course,
businesses who dominated a market found this idea attractive. Were it true,
it would have profound implications:it would imply not only that anti-
trust policy was unneeded, but attempts to break up monopolies might
actually be welfare decreasing, since the smaller units could not take
advantage of the economies of scale.
Elsewhere, we (Dasgupta and Stiglitz, 1988, Stiglitz, 1988a) have shown
the contestability doctrine not to be robust: all it takes is an epsilon of
sunk costs to act as an effective barrier to entry. Under some
circumstances, profits may be bid away, but even then, prices remain at an
economically inefficient Level; profits are dissipated in excess entry. The
point is a simple one:firm decisions to enter are based not on current
prices, but on their judgments about what would happen to prices if they
enter.If they think the incumbent firm will lower his price, then entry
may be unattractive.And we have shown that, in equilibrium under a
variety of conditions, that is precisely what the incumbent will do.Of
course, in the limiting case of no sunk costs, the entrant has nothing to
lose:he enters for a second, and if the incumbent lowers his price, he
33simply leaves. But there is hardly an industry in which there aren't some
sunk costs (if only the sunk costs associated with learning about the
industry), and in many cases they are substantial.
In the days before airline deregulation, airlines were held up as the
example par excellence of an industry with no (sic) sunk costs. (Of course,
if you want to make money, customers must know that you are flying; you must
advertise, and those are sunk costs.) The post-deregulation era has
provided convincing refutation of the contestability doctrine: at the very
least, it cannot be taken as a general proposition. In market after
market, prices have tumbled as entry occurred; as incumbents matched
entrant's fares, customers chose the familiar brands; entrants were forced
to leave; and prices were quickly restored to levels far higher than
marginal costs. Potential competition simply did not suffice.49
As I remarked earlier, R & D involves fixed, sunk costs, and the
discussion of potential competition thus has an immediate bearing on
industrial sectors in which research places an important role. Potential
competition does not ensure that the level of R & D expenditures will be
socially efficient.Indeed, under some circumstances, a firm which has a
technological leadership can behave almost as it would were it an unfettered
monopolist:for it can establish a sufficient lead that competitors will
credibly believe that, were they to enter, the incumbent would respond by
491t has also been argued (Baumol, Bailey and Willig) that multi-
product firms (say an unregulated utility) will charge the same structure of
prices that the government would charge, were it faced with running the
enterprise. Both would employ Ramsey-Boiteux prices.But there is only a
superficial resemblance between the two. For example, unless the
unregulated utility is protected against entry, he will take into account
the supply responses of potential competitors, should he charge too high a
price for some service.There are several other differences between the
two. See Sappington and Stiglitz (l987b).
34speeding up his research program. Given that, entrants have no incentive to
enter. (Dasgupta and Stiglitz, 1988, Stiglitz, l988a). °
Thisposes the fundamental question:can we have much confidence in
the invisible hand working well in modern industrial economies? At this
juncture, any belief in the invisible hand must be taken as an article of
faith, not a scientifically established proposition.
Part V.
Ideology and the Invisible Hand
Economists want to believe in the invisible hand.Or at least many
American economists do.The quest for generalizing the invisible hand
theorem--an unsuccessful quest, in my view--has been a central focus of much
of the profession during recent decades. Results abound in the literature--
results which, upon closer examination, simply don't hold up.
Not all of this is motivated by ideology. Some of it is motivated by
fashion and academia's reward structure (the invisible hand at work again,
though now not necessarily promoting the general welfare):it may be
relatively easy to write a paper following the standard formula, which
50This analysis also throws into doubt Schumpeter's views concerning
the effectiveness of competition as a driving force for innovation, and his
characterization of market economies as a succession of innovators.
At the same time, I do not want to underestimate the importance of
competition as a stimulant for innovation: our objective here is only to
recognize its limits.
35begins with a (very) brief introduction stating a limitation in previous
writers' work, a model which is a slight modification of the well-accepted
competitive model, and then the theorem:under the stipulated (often
uninterpretable) conditions, market equilibrium is Pareto efficient.
And finally, some of it is motivated by "honest error." A natural
research strategy is to begin with simple models, and then extend them by
making them more complex.The natural simplifications employed to get
easily tractable models turn out to be the special conditions under which
markets are sometimes Pareto efficient.
Let me illustrate these quests for a Stronger Invisible Hand by three
more examples (in addition to the Contestability example given in the
preceding section).
Imperfect risk markets. When Arrow and Debreu originally proved their
result, they assumed that there was a complete set of risk markets- -a
clearly unsatisfactory assumption.A natural question was, would the
economy be efficient if there were fewer risk markets, say a stock market;
or, more particularly, would the market be constrained Pareto efficient,
taking into account the limited availability of risk markets.Diamond
(1967) showed that it would be.But he found the (essentially) singular
case where that result holds- -theremust be only one commodity. With two or
more commodities, the market is constrained Pareto inefficient, except in
the singular case where the two commodities are the same (or where all
individuals are identical, so no risk markets are really needed [see
Stiglitz, 1982a]).
36Moral hazard.Following Stiglitz (1974b) and Ross (1973), principal
agent problems have typically been characterized as the solution to a simple
problem: maximize the utility of the principal subject to the agent
receiving a particular level of expected utility. Shavell (1979) used this
framework to analyze insurance markets, and to conclude that the market
equilibrium is efficient. But this result too is terribly special- -it
requires, for instance, that there is a single good.(See Arnott and
Stiglitz, 1989).
Real Business Cycles.The misleading nature of the earlier optimality
results on moral hazard and incomplete markets discussed in the previous
paragraphs is perhaps understandable: the single commodity assumption was a
natural assumption to begin the analysis of an admittedly complex problem.
I am, however, far less sympathetic with the special nature of the
optimality results reported in recent work in macro-economics. One of the
central objectives of research in that area is to understand unemployment,
its causes, its consequences, and how it varies over time. Little insight
into that question is obtained by assuming market clearing- -thatthere is no
unemployment. Even if one claims little more than this is the first stage
of a long term research programme, which eventually is aimed at contributing
insights into this phenomenon, it seems a peculiar way to begin such a
research programme.
Similarly, itshould seem obvious that the consequences of
unemployment- -at least the social consequences- -are far different than an
37equi-percentage reduction in the hours worked by and the income of each
individual.
Elsewhere, we have argued (Creenwald and Stiglitz, l988b) that many of
the central macro-economic phenomena can be traced to asymmetric information
in labor, capital, and product markets.If that is the case, it makes
little sense to begin macro-economic analysis with representative agent
models, for in their very formulation they preclude most of the central
problems of asymmetric information.
But even if one does not agree on the importance that we ascribe to
asymmetric information, how can one, in good faith, use a representative
agent model to conclude that the economy is efficient (the invisible hand)
and that therefore government intervention is counter-efficient: true
enough, the conclusions follow from the assumptions. But by now, we know
how special those assumptions are, that with incomplete risk markets and
imperfect information, markets are essentially never constrained Pareto
efficient (except in singular cases, such as when all individuals are
identical, when no trade would occur on markets for trading risks, were they
to exist.)
We have also shown that market equilibrium with just a little bit of
information can be markedly different from equilibrium with perfect
information.Why, then, make a pretense of "theoretical rigor" for such
models? The structures of theoretical rigor are imposed to add confidence
in the conclusions of the analysis. But what confidence can we have, if we
already know that the results are not robust to slight alterations in the
assumptions?
38A research programme, the objective of which is to show that the
observed fluctuations in employment and output could be the outcome of
shocks to technology in a perfectly competitive economy with perfect (or at
least symmetric) information seems to be sufficiently flawed as to raise
questions why it has been pursued with such enthusiasm: could it be that the
policy conclusions of such a theory- -thatthe outcomes of market processes
that we observed, however peculiar and unattractive they might seem, are in
fact efficient and that government action is unnecessary- -satisfy some
ideological programme?
Although real business cycle theory, and its cousin the new classical
theory, claim to follow in the tradition of classical economics, they have
gone far beyond what the classical economists (or Adam Smith) would have
claimed.These economists did not claim that the economy instantaneously
adjusted to full employment, only that there was a long run tendency for
full employment.Pigou postulated a mechanism- -thereal balance effect- -
whichwould restore the economy to full employment, but the mechanism was a
slow one:even at the maximum rate at which prices fell during the Great
Depression,51 it would have taken more than a century for the economy to
recover!
Concluding Remarks
The two hundred years since Adam Smith wrote his masterpiece has
witnessed an unprecedented increase in living standards within capitalist
51And even ignoring the Barro-Ricardo arguments suggesting that the
elasticity of consumption with respect to changes in the real value of
outstanding government bonds is much lower (perhaps zero) than the
elasticity of consumption with respect to wealth in general.
39economies. The fruits of this growth have, moreover, been widely
distributed. I suspect that Smith would have been astonished at how
effectively the invisible hand had worked, how well it had served to
increase the wealth of nations.
But in the face of such achievements, he would, I think, have looked on
at astonishment at those exaggerated claims --meantto be interpretations of
his invisible hand conjecture- -that the market economy was Nirvana on earth,
that resources were always and instantaneously allocated in a (Pareto)
efficient manner.Such exaggerated claims do a disservice, even to those
who would like to see government play a very limited role in economic
activity.
We now recognize that it is only under highly idealized circumstances
that the market economy is constrained Pareto efficient.Some of the
inefficiencies of the market economy are small, and some- -like the periodic
episodes of massive unemployment that have plagued capitalist economies
during the past two century--are not so small. Whether, or how, democratic
governments can best improve matters, and whether they are likely to do so,
are questions which take us beyond the scope of this paper.When the
central result of economics was that no government- -nomatter how well
designed--could possibly improve upon market allocations, there was no need
to enquire into these matters of political economy.There was a simple
prescription: government activity should be limited to lump sum
redistributions and correcting a well defined and limited set of market
failures.But now that we see that market failures (in the sense of
constrained Pareto efficiency) are pervasive, that they arise in all aspects
of economic life, and that issues of efficiency and equity cannot be neatly
40separated, these issues of political economy cannot be ignored. But these
issues- -and not the issue of whether the market economy attains the ideal of
Pareto Efficiency--are, or ought to be, the focus of debate and discussion
in democratic societies.
41References
Akerlof, C.A., "Market for Lemons: Quality Uncertainty and Market Mechanism,"
Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol 84, No. 3, 1970, pp. 488-500.
_______________"ATheory of Social Custom of Which Unemployment May Be a
Consequence," Quarterly Journal of Economics, June 1980, PP. 749-775.
_____________'CiftExchange and Efficiency Wage Theory: Four Views,"
American Economic Review Papers aridProceedings,May 1984, pp. 79-84.
Akerlof, G.A. and Dickens, W.T., "The Economic Consequences of Cognitive
Dissonance," American Economic Review, Vol 72, No. 3, 1982, pp. 307-379.
Arnott,R.and Stiglitz, J.E. ,"Equilibriumin Competitive Insurance
Markets," Mimeo, Princeton University, December 1983.
______________"LaborTurnover, Wage Structure and Moral Hazard: The
Inefficiency of Competitive Markets," Journal of Labor Economics, Vol. 3,
No. 4, October 1985, pp. 434-462.
_____________"MoralHazard and Optimal Commodity Taxation," Journal of
Public Economics, Vol 29, 1986, pp. 1-24.
______________"TheBasic Analytics of Moral Hazard," Scandinavian Journal
of Economics, Vol. 90, No. 3, 1988a, pp. 383-413.
_____________"TheWelfare Economics of Moral Hazard," forthcoming in Risk.
Information and Insurance: Essays in the Memory of Karl H. Borch, Henri
Louberge, Editor, Kiuwer Academic Publishers (Norwell, MA), 1989.
_____________"Randomizationwith Asymmetric Information," forthcominp in
Rand Journal of Economics, 1989.
Arrow, K.J., "An Extension of the Basic Theorems of Classical Welfare
Economics," Proceedings of the Second Berkeley Symposium, University of
California Press (Berkeley), 1951.
_____________"Towarda Theory of Price Adjustment," in The Allocation of
Economic Resources, P.A. Baran, T. Scitovsky and E.S. Shaw, Editors, Stanford
University Press (Stanford), 1958.
______________SocialChoice and Individual Values, 2nd Edition, John Wiley
and Sons (New York), 1963.
Bator, F., "The Anatomy of Market Failures," Quarterly Journal of Economics,
Vol 72, 1958, pp. 351-379.
Baumol, W.J., Bailey, M.N., and Willig, R., "Weak Invisible Hand Theorems on
the Sustainability of Prices in a Multiproduct Monopoly," American Economic
Review, Vol. 67, 1977, pp. 350-365.
42Baumol, W.J., Panzar, J. and Willig, R., Contestable Markets and the Theory
of Industry Structure, Harcourt Brace Janovich (New York) 1982.
Dasgupta, P. and Stiglitz, J., "Uncertainty, Market Structure and the Speed
of R & D, Bell Journal of Economics, Vol. 11, No. 1, Spring 1980, pp. 1-28.
_________________"PotentialCompetition, Actual Competition and Economic
Welfare," European Economic Review, Vol. 32, May 1988, pp. 569-577.
Debreu, C.,Theoryof Value, 1959.
_____________"ExcessDemand Functions," Mimeo, University of California,
Berkeley, 1973.
Demsetz, H., "WhyRegulateUtilities?" Journal of LawandEconomics, Vol. 77,
1968, pp. 55-66.
Diamond, P. A., "The Role of a Stock Market in a General Equilibrium Model
with Technological Uncertainty," American Economic Review, Vol. 57, 1967, pp.
753-776.
_____________"Modelof Price Adjustment," Journal of Economic Theory, Vol.
8, No. 3, 1971, pp. 337-360.
Diamond, P.A. and Mirrlees, J.A., "Optimal Taxation and Public Production. 1
-ProductionEfficiency," American Economic Review, Vol. 67, No. 1, l97la,
pp. 8-27.
_____________ "OptimalTaxation and Public Production. 2 -TaxRules,
American Economic Review, Vol. 67, No. 3, 197lb, pp. 261-278.
Geanakoplos, J., Magill, M., Quinzii, M. and Dreze, J .,"Generic Inefficiency
of Stock Market Equilibriuu1 When Markets are Incomplete," forthcoming in
Journal of Mathematical Economics, 1989.
Creenwald, B.C., "Adverse Selection in the Labor Market," Review of Economic
Studies, Vol. 53, No. 3, 1986, pp. 325-367.
Greenwald, B.C. and Closspie, R.R., "Adverse Selection in the Market for
Slaves in New Orleans," Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 98, No. 37,
pp.479-499.
Creenwald, B.C. and Stiglitz, J.E., "Externalities in Economics with
Imperfect Information and Incomplete Markets," Quarterly Journal of
Economics, Vol. 101, May 1986, pp. 229-256.
_____________"ParetoInefficiency of Market Economies: Search and
Efficiency Wage Models," American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings,
Vol. 78, Nay l988a, pp. 351-355.
______________"ExaminingAlternative Macroeconomic Theories," Brooking.s
Papers on Economic Activity, No. 1, 1988b, pp. 207-270.
43Greenwald, B.C., Stiglitz, J.E., and Weiss, A., "Informational Imperfections
in the Capital markets and Macroeconomic Fluctuations," American Economic
Review Papers and Proceedings, Vol. 74, No. 4, May 1984, pp. 794-200.
Grossman, S.J., 'Nash Equilibrium and the Industrial Organization of Markets
with Large Fixed Costs," Econometrica, Vol. 49, 1981, pp. 7749-7772.
_______________"ACharacterization of the Optimality of Equilibrium in
Incomplete Markets," Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 15, 1977, pp. 1-15.
Hall, R.E., "The Relation between Price and Marginal Cost in U.S. Industry,"
Journal of Political Economy, October 1988, pp. 921-947.
Hall, R.E. and Jorgenson, D.W., "Tax Policy and Investment Behavior -Reply
and Further Results," American Economic Review, Vol. 57, No. 3, June 1967,
pp. 388-401.
Jorgenson, D.W., "Comparison of Alternative Theories of Corporate Investment
Behavior," American Economic Review, Vol. 58, No. 4, 1968, pp. 681-712.
Mantel, R.R., "Characterization of Aggregate Excess Demand," Journal of
Economic Theory, Vol. 7, No. 3, 1974, pp. 368-353.
Meyer, J. and Kuh, E., The Investment Decision, Harvard University Press
(Cambridge), 1957.
Mirrlees, J.A., "Exploration in Theory of Optimum Income Taxation," Review of
Economic Studies, 1971, Vol. 38, pp. 775-208.
Modigliani, F. and Miller, M., "The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance and
the Theory of Investment," American Economic Review, Vol. 48, No. 3, June
1958, pp. 261-297.
Myers, C.S. and Majluf, N.S., "Corporate Financing and Investment Decisions
When Firms Have Information That Investors Do Not Have," Journal of Financial
Economics, 1984, Vol 13, No. 2, pp. 787-221.
Nalebuff, B. and Stiglitz, J.E., "Prizes and Incentives: Towards a General
Theory of Compensation and Competition," Bell Journal of Economics, Spring
1983, Vol. 74, pp. 21-43.
Newbery, D. and Stiglitz, J.E., The Theory of Commodity Price Stabilization,
Oxford University Press, 1981.
_______________"TheChoice of Techniques and the Optimality of Market
Equilibrium with Rational Expectations," Journal of Political Economy, Vol.
90, No. 2, April 1982, pp. 223-246.
______________"ParetoInferior Trade," Review of Economic Studies, Vol.
LI, No. 164, January 1984, pp. 1-13.
44_____________"Riskand Trade Policy," World Bank Working Paper No. 53,
January 1983, Revised 1985.
______________ "WageRigidity, Implicit Contracts, Unemployment and
Economic Efficiency," Economic Journal, June 1987, Vol. 97, No. 386, pp. 615-
630.
Prescott,E.C., and Townsend,E.M.,"Pareto Optima and Competitive
Equilibria with Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard," Econometrica, 1984,
Vol. 52, No. 7, pp. 21-45.
Radner, R. and Stiglitz, J.E., "A Nonconcavity in the Value of Information,"
in Bayselan Models in Economic Theory, M. Boyer and R. Khilstroni eds,
Elsevier Science Publications, 1984, pp. 33-52.
Ross, S.A., "Economic Theory of Agency-Principal Problems," American Economic
Review, 1973, Vol. 63, No. 2, pp. 734-739.
Sah, R.J. and Stiglitz, i.E., "Perpetuation, Self-Reproduction, and Evolution
of Organizations: The Selection and Performance of Managers," Paper presented
to the 1985 World Congress of the Econometric Society, Cambridge, August
1985a.
"Human Fallibility and Economic Organization," American
Economic Review, May 1985b, pp. 292-297.
______________"TheArchitecture of Economic Systems: Hierarchies and
Polyarchies," American Economic Review, September 1986, pp. 716-727.
______________"ManagerialSelection and Performance," mimeo, 1987.
______________"Committees,Hierarchiesand Polyarchies,"Economic
Journal, Vol. 98, June 1988, pp. 451-470.
Salop, S.C., "Information and Monopolistic Competition," American Economic
Review, Vol. 66, No. 2, May 1976, pp. 240-245.
______________".rategicEntry Deterrence," American Economic Review, May
1979, pp. 335-338.
Salop, S.C., and Stiglitz, J.E., "Bargains and Ripoffs: A Model of
Monopolistically Competitive Price Dispersions," Review of Economic Studies,
Vol. 44, October 1977, pp. 339-365.
_______________"TheTheory of Sales: A Simple Mode of Equilibrium Price
Dispersion with Identical Agents," American Economic Review, Vol. 72, No. 5,
December 1982, pp. 7721-7730.
Sappington, D.and Stiglitz,J.E.,"Privatization,Information and
Incentives," Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, Vol. 6, No. 4, l987a,
pp. 567-582.
45______________"Informationand Regulation," Public Information, E. Bailey,
Editor, Mit Press (London), l987b, pp. 3-43.
Schumpeter, J.A., Capitalism. Socialism and Democracy, MIT Press (Cambridge,
MA), 1936.
Scitovsky, T., "Some Consequences of the Market of Judging Quality by Price,"
Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 12, No. 2, 1945, pp. 700-705.
_____________"Ignoranceas a Source of Oligopoly Power," American Economic
Review, Vol. 40, 1950, pp. 48-53.
Shapiro, C., and Stiglitz, J.E., "Equilibrium Unemployment as a Worker
Discipline Device," American Economic Review, Vol. 74, No. 3, June 1984, pp.
433-444.
Shavell, S., "On Moral Hazard and Insurance," Quarterly Journal of Economics,
Vol. 93, 1979, pp. 541-562.
Skinner, A.S., "Smith, A. and American Economic Community: Essay in Applied
Economics," Journal of History of Ideas, Vol. 73, No. 7, 1976, pp. 59-78.
Smith, A., The Wealth of Nations, 1776, Random House, Inc., Modern Library
Edition (New York), 1937.
Sonnenschein, H., "Do Walras' Identity and Continuity Characterize the Class
of Community Excess Demand Functions?," Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 6,
No. 4, 1973, pp. 345-354.
Stiglitz, J.E., "On the Optimality of the Stock Market Allocation of
Investment," Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 86, No. 1, February 1972,
pp. 25-60.
_______________"Taxation,Corporate Financial Policy and the Cost of
Capital," Journal of Public Economics, Vol. 2, February 1973a, pp. 1-34.
______________"Approachesto the Economics of Discrimination," American
Economic Review, Vol. 62, No. 2, May 1973b, pp. 287-2c.
_____________"Theoriesof Discrimination and Economic Policy," Patterns
of Racial Discrimination, C. von Furstenberg, A. Horwitz and B. Harrison,
Editors, D. C. Heath and Company (Lexington Books), l974a, pp. 5-26.
_____________"Incentivesand Risk Sharing in Sharecropping," Review of
Economic Studies, Vol. 41, April 1974b, pp. 213-255.
_______________"AlternativeTheories of Wage Determination and Unemployment
in LDC's: The Labor Turnover Model," Quarterly Journal of Economics Vol. 87,
May l974c, pp. 194-227.
______________"TheInefficiency of the Stock Market Equilibrium," Review
of Economic Studies, April l982a, pp. 247-261.
46______________"Ownership,Control and Efficient markets: Some Paradoxes in
the Theory of Capital Markets," in Economic Population: Essays in Honor of
James R, Nelson, K. D. Boyer and W. C. Shepherd eds., Michigan State
University Press, 1982b, pp. 311-361.
______________"SelfSelection and Pareto Efficient Taxation," Journal of
Public Economics, Vol. 17, 1982c, pp. 213-240.
"Some Aspects of the Taxation of Capital Gains" Journal of
Public Economics, Vol. 21, July 1983, pp. 257-294.
"Information and Economic Analysis: A Perspective," Economic
Journal, 1985, pp. 21-61.
______________•"Theoryof Competition,Incentives and Risk," New
Developments in the Theory of Market Structure, J. Stiglitz and F. Mathewson,
Editors, MacMillan/MIT Press, 1986, pp. 399-449.
______________"Onthe Microeconomics of Technical Progress," in Technology
Generation in Latin American Manufacturing Industries, Jorge M. Katz ed.,
Macmillan Press Ltd. (Hampshire, England), 1987a, pp. 56-77
"Human Nature and Economic Organization," Jacob Marschak
Lecture prepared for the Far Eastern Meetings of the Econometric Society,
October 1987b.
_______________"ParetoEfficient and Optimal Taxation and New Welfare
Economics," in Handbook of Public Economics, A. Aurbach and M. Feldstein
eds., Elsevier Science Publishers, 1987c, pp. 991-1042.
"The Causes and Consequences o the Dependence of Quality on
Prices," Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. 25, March 1987d, pp. 1-47.
_______________"Competitionand the Number of Firms in a Market: Are
Duopolies More Competitive Than Atomistic Markets?" Journal of Political
Economy, 1987e, pp. 1041-1061.
______________ TechnologicalChange, Sunk Costs and Competition,'
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity (3-1987)
-SpecialIssue on
Microeconoinics, N.N. Bailey and C. Winston eds., 1988a, pp. 883-967.
______________ EconomicOrganization, Information and Development," in
Handbook of Development Economics, H. Chenery and T. N. Srinivasan eds.
Elsevier Science Publishers, 1988b, pp. 94-160.
______________"Markets,Market Failures and Development," American
Economic Review Papers and Proceedings, Vol. 79, No. 2, May 1989a, pp. 797-
203.
47______________"ImperfectInformation in the Product Market," forthcoming
in Handbook of Industrial Organization, Vol. 1, Elsevier Science Publishers,
1989b.
____________TheEconomic Role of the State, A. Heertje ed., Bank
Insinger de Beaufort NV (Amsterdam), 1989c.
______________"Incentives,Information and Organizational Design,"
Empirica, Vol. 16. No. 1, January 1989d, pp. 3-29.
Stiglitz, J. and Weiss, A., "Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect
Information," American Economic Review, Vol. 71, June 1981, pp. 393-410.
Vickers, J. and Yarrow, C., Privatizatlon: An Economic Analysis, MIT Press
(Cambridge, MA), 1988.
48